IDEV

Independent Development Evaluation
Évaluation indépendante du développement

Evaluation of the Bank's Role in Increasing Access to Finance in Africa: Technical Annexes

Thematic Evaluation

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AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP

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1. ANNEX

Annex 1: Methodological Note

The methodology for the evaluation includes:

- **Literature review**, including analysis of operational documents (appraisal, supervision, back to office and completions reports), strategy papers (AfDB's and countries' specific and general strategies), relevant evaluations (on instruments and strategies by AfDB and other International Financial Institutions (IFIs), AfDB's and IFIs publications;

- **Statistical analysis** of the information on the operations from the Bank's databases;

- **Qualitative analysis of operational documents** including appraisal reports, supervision reports, back to office reports, completion reports, and evaluation notes of completion reports;

- **Semi-structured interviews** (1) at the headquarters of the Bank in Abidjan with the teams involved, currently or in the past, in designing, managing or monitoring financial sector operations of the Bank; (2) during the fieldwork with direct and end beneficiary institutions, various stakeholders involved in the financial sector ecosystem, international organizations and AfDB's in-country team involved in designing, managing or monitoring the financial sector operations

- **Questionnaires:** (1) an online questionnaire sent to managers and task managers working on financial sector activities aspects related to the policy, quality of design of operations, Bank's capacity, implementation performance, and outcomes; (2) questionnaires to managers of the client institutions and end-beneficiaries on the use of funds and typology of end-beneficiaries in order to help assess more precisely the outcomes of the operations.

The review resorted to several distinct approaches:

- **Descriptive and analytical approach.** A descriptive approach to review the financial sector development policy document and identify trends and structures in the operations through Bank's databases and various policy and operational documents. More analytical analysis is carried out on appraisal and implementation performance and results on a selected sample of operations.

- **Before and after approach.** To assess the extent to which the 2014 Policy and Strategy influenced portfolio composition and performance, the evaluation compared operations before and after its adoption in October 2014 i.e. respectively, in 2011-2014 and 2015-2018.

- **Desk review and field meetings.** The desk review enabled the review of the operations portfolio, the policy and strategy document, and the relevant literature. The field review included fieldwork in seven countries to cover 32 operations, individual and focus group interviews with managers and task managers, clients and end-beneficiaries, and a questionnaire sent to the managers, task managers, clients, and end beneficiaries.

Research Components	Sources of Information	Methods of Analysis	Deliverables
Policy Analysis and Strategy Review	- Literature and data on the financial sector in general and in Africa - Bank policies related to the financial sector - Appraisal reports - Bank Staff, Management and Board members - Policies of other multilateral and bilateral Institutions	- Document Review - Statistical analysis - Interviews with Bank Staff, Managers, and Board members - Interviews with the staff of other multilateral and bilateral Institutions	- A report including findings, conclusions, and suggestions to consider
Analysis of Quality at Entry	- Appraisal Reports - Project Completion Reports - Project Completion Report Reviews Project Performance Evaluation Reports - Country Strategy Papers - Bank Staff - Review of ADOA Summary reports, - Credit risk notes for private sector projects	- A purposive sample of all projects (completed and on-going) - Policy documents Review - Rating of Appraisal Reports to analyze design quality - Statistical analysis - Interviews with Bank staff	- A report including findings, conclusions, and suggestions to consider
Portfolio Review	- Bank's databases: SAP, DARMS, Statistical Department Database - XSRs, PPERs, CPRs, APPRs - Supervision reports and ratings on implementation progress - Country Strategy Papers - Bank Staff	- Statistical analysis - Review of documents - Rating of projects documents (Appraisal reports mainly) - Rating of completion reports to analyze the effectiveness - Interviews with Bank staff - Review of the delivery system including M&E	- A report including findings, conclusions, and suggestions to consider
Fieldwork	- Bank documents and data - Selected project documents - Bank staff, implementing institutions, and beneficiaries	- Project documents and data, interviews, - Field visits to country and projects - Assessment of evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, and sustainability	- Report on each selected country and a synthesis report. They comprise findings and suggestions to consider
Summary Report	- Reports on policy/strategy, portfolio, and fieldwork	- Integration of the above analysis into one single report around key evaluation questions	- A summary report including findings, conclusions, and recommndations.

Annex 2. Reconstruction of the theory of change of the FSDPS



Annex 3. Access to Finance in African Countries

Nr.	Countries	Category	Account (Percentage of Age 15+)			
			2011	2014	2017	Variation
1	Mauritius	Upper middle income	80	82	90	10
2	Kenya	Lower middle income	42	75	82	39
3	Namibia	Upper middle income	n.a	59	81	81
4	South Africa	Upper middle income	54	70	69	16
5	Libya	Upper middle income	n.a	n.a	66	n.a
6	Uganda	Low income	20	44	59	39
7	Gabon	Upper middle income	19	33	59	40
8	Ghana	Lower middle income	29	41	58	28
9	Zimbabwe	Low income	40	32	55	16
10	Botswana	Upper middle income	30	52	51	21
11	Rwanda	Low income	33	42	50	17
12	Tanzania	Low income	17	40	47	29
13	Zambia	Lower middle income	21	36	46	24
14	Lesotho	Low middle income	18	n.a	46	27
15	Togo	Low income	10	18	45	35
16	Burkina Faso	Low income	13	14	43	30
17	Algeria	Upper middle income	33	50	43	9
18	Senegal	Low income	6	15	42	37
19	Mozambique	Low income	n.a	n.a	42	42
20	Cote d'Ivoire	Lower middle income	n.a	34	41	41
21	Nigeria	Lower middle income	30	44	40	10
22	Benin	Low income	10	17	38	28
23	Tunisia	Lower middle income	n.a	27	37	37
24	Liberia	Low income	19	n.a	36	17
25	Mali	Low income	8	20	35	27
26	Ethiopia	Low income	n.a	22	35	35
27	Cameroon	Lower middle income	15	12	35	20
28	Malawi	Low income	17	18	34	17
29	Egypt, Arab Republic	Lower middle income	10	14	33	23
30	Morocco	Lower middle income	n.a	n.a	29	n.a
31	Congo, Republic	Lower middle income	10	17	26	16
32	Congo, Dem. Republic	Low income	4	17	26	22
33	Guinea	Low income	4	7	23	20
34	Chad	Low income	9	12	22	13
35	Mauritania	Low income	17	23	21	3
36	Sierra Leone	Low income	15	16	20	4
37	Madagascar	Low income	6	9	18	12
38	Niger	Low income	2	7	16	14
39	Central African Republic	Low income	3	n.a	14	10
40	South Soudan	Low income	n.a	n.a	9	n.a
41	Burundi	Low income	7	7	n.a	0 (2014)
42	Comoros	Low income	22	n.a	n.a	n.a
43	Djibouti	Low income	12	n.a	n.a	n.a
44	Sudan	Lower middle income	7	15	n.a	8 (2014)
45	Somalia	Low income	n.a	39	n.a	n.a

Source: Global Findex Database, n.a: information non-available.

Annex 4. Summary Notes from the Reports on the Fieldwork

BURKINA FASO

The operations evaluated were two lines of credit (LOCs) to financial institutions: (i) Fidelis Finance SA (Fidelis) approved in 2014, for UA 2.21 million over five years with a deferral of one year; and Coris Bank International (Coris) approved in 2016, for UA 30.3 million over eight years with a deferral of two years. In addition, a loan to Burkina Faso for 40 years with five years of deferral for a Support Project to Establish an Agribusiness Bank (PACBA) was approved in 2018 for a total amount of UA 7.625 million.

Main findings

The relevance of the two LOCs directed toward SMEs was satisfactory. Both LOCs responded to the essential needs in the country. The LOC to Fidelis was provided with technical assistance (TA), before its approval and post-disbursement. Neither LOC created any market distortions. However, given that the funding could not be provided in local currencies for West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) countries, and was provided instead in euro, this led to an increase in the financing costs (of 1.8 and 1.9 percent, respectively), making the funding less competitive in terms of pricing than other offers in local currencies. Also, the potential change in parity of the West African CFA franc (CFA) could represent a risk for the tenor operations of eight years, such as the one for Coris Bank. The PACBA project's relevance was satisfactory, as it responded to unmet needs in terms of financing agribusiness. However, the relevance of refinancing the capital contribution made by the government to this bank for a total amount of FCFA 5 billion was questionable. Building a business plan, defining its development strategy in rural areas, or providing long-term funding to the PACBA could have been more relevant to help PACBA become operational and reach its ambitious goals toward meeting its rural targets more quickly.

The design of the LOCs was found to be relevant. Highly skilled teams designed the operations. However, in the case of Coris, some of the targeted companies were large enterprises, which made the relevance of this LOC questionable. The design of the PACBA operation was found to be unsatisfactory, as it did not include lessons learned from current or past experience in terms of warrantage and agricultural insurance in Burkina Faso.

*At the level of financial intermediaries (FIs), the effectiveness of the two LOCs was considered satisfactory***.** In both cases, the LOCs were used rapidly as there was high demand in the market. The repayment schedules of the two LOCs were both respected. Both institutions have a suitable internal organization and previous experience in granting credit to private customers composed of SMEs. However, end-beneficiaries were poorly targeted. In particular, there was no specific targeting of women, youth, or rural businesses as initially targeted during the design phase. In both cases, the number of companies funded by the LOCs and the number of jobs created were far lower than set at the design stage, suggesting a change in targeting of the companies. Also, in the case of Coris, indicators aimed at monitoring the composition of the portfolio and the results achieved by the end-beneficiaries were not put in place. As for PACBA, the project is still in its start-up phase and, as a consequence, effectiveness could not be assessed.

The due diligence process for Coris was considered very unsatisfactory, in particular, due to: (i) the long delays between the approval and disbursements; (ii) the payment by Coris of a commitment fee; and (iii) the fees that Coris had to pay for legal services, which had been negotiated by the Bank and were perceived by Coris as being overvalued compared with the market. In the case of Fidelis, the process was satisfactory: the LOC's disbursement in one tranche was rapid following the signing of the loan agreement. Similarly, the approval and signing process was rapid for the PACBA project. However, there were delays in disbursement, as the Government of Burkina Faso took the time to waive some of the conditions before disbursement.

With regard to FIs, the two recipients of the LOCs are likely to continue to provide financing to SMEs. Both FIs' financial situations have improved over time, their operations are growing, and the SME segment represents one of their priorities. As PACBA has only recently started its activities, the potential risk factors that could hinder the achievement of its objectives and sustainability could be possible mission drift or political interference.

The Bank's performance was satisfactory. The LOCs were considered to meet the needs in terms of medium- and long-term financing. Its end-beneficiaries appreciated the Bank's TA to partner financial institutions. However, the Bank's impact on the long-term development of Burkina Faso's financial sector was limited given the scope of its operations, which did not address the structural issues faced in terms of FSD and financial inclusion.

Points to consider

1. Deepen the consideration of the role that financial sector operations should play in achieving the development objectives of the Bank's strategy in a country, and be more explicit regarding how the Bank's operations contribute toward providing sustainable solutions to financial sector weaknesses (for example, by articulating theories of change); similarly, organize regular events to present the Bank's interventions, strategy, tools and partnership opportunities to actors in the private sector.
2. Seek partnership with other funders to jointly support initiatives aimed at structuring and developing the financial system as a whole or at improving banks' risk-management ecosystem, in addition to operations aimed at funding the private sector directly.
3. Consider lending in local currencies in the WAEMU countries, to be more competitive in these markets, including in Burkina Faso.
4. Discuss at the design stage the indicators required to monitor development results and ensure that, as soon as the funds are disbursed, clients set up a monitoring and evaluation system that allows the measuring of these indicators.
5. Analyze the options for strengthening the component *support to secure the agricultural finance ecosystem of PACBA operations toward priority areas for the Banque Agricole du Faso*, which should contribute to its success and strengthen the Bank's relevance and impact's operation.

CAMEROON

The operation evaluated is the Partial Credit Guarantee for Currency Risk Hedging (PCGCRH) for €500 million in connection with the issuance of a Eurobond in 2015 by Cameroon.

Key Findings

*The relevance of the operation was considered unsatisfactory***.** The Bank implemented this type of operation for the first time in 2015. All other factors being equal, it was a relevant operation and technically well designed and implemented. However, even if the operation did not consist of guaranteeing the Eurobond, it cannot be assessed without considering the issuance of the Eurobond, which was the operation's raison d'être, affecting its methods of preparation and its characteristics. From this perspective, the operation was considered unsatisfactory based on the following evaluation criteria: The Eurobond issuance project in which the PCGCRH was supported was not sufficiently mature, while the preparation level for the Eurobond issuance process was highly inadequate. Therefore, this exchange risk hedging operation was applied to a transaction that was itself highly unsatisfactory. More importantly, apart from FCFA 150 billion used for the reimbursement of a loan granted to Cameroon in February 2015 by a consortium of banks to allow it to repay part of its arrears toward the national refining company (SONARA), the projects linked to the Eurobond were not mature. Therefore, they could not be financed with the Eurobond resources as planned.

The operation's design was unsatisfactory, even if the operation had been well designed from a technical point of view. Being an innovative and complex operation, it was not fully mastered by the Bank's teams, and as such, the mainspring for the operation must be called into question. Indeed, Cameroon's insufficient preparation in launching this Eurobond should have been the subject of better assessment by the Bank, which, moreover, failed to consult the Central Bank of Central African States (BEAC) to learn its opinion. The BEAC plays an advisory role for the national monetary authorities of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC). The nature of the transaction, which involved currencies, required consultation before such a transaction.

The effectiveness of the operation was unsatisfactory. The expected outputs were partially realized, but there were risks regarding the sustainability of public debt. The use of the Eurobond funds, which originally motivated the intervention, failed to meet the objectives initially pursued and originally justified the Eurobond issuance. The IMF and the Ministry of Finance expressed concerns regarding the risks of over-indebtedness over time and the difficulties in meeting repayment deadlines in 2023, 2024, and 2025. In addition, the transfer of expertise from this innovative financial instrument to national administrations was not ensured. Despite the support in the expertise provided, the experience with this first Cameroon Eurobond issue was not capitalized upon. For example, no document was produced to trace the process and define the procedures to conduct such a process in the future.

The transaction's efficiency was unsatisfactory, although technically, the swap transaction was carried out in a satisfactory manner. The lead times for the process were longer than expected. Launched in February 2015, the Eurobond issue could not occur until the following November, about 5 months behind schedule. The issue thus came at a time when rates had become high on the international market. Cameroon, therefore, had to go into debt at an interest rate of 9.75 percent, against the desired ceiling of 7.5 percent, one of the highest interest rates serviced by an African country. In addition, against an initial target of US$1.5 billion, the Government of Cameroon limited the amount of funds raised to US$750 million to reduce the impact of the high-interest rate. Moreover, under these conditions, the amount of the guarantee was reduced by almost €200 million of the Bank's commitment capacity vis-à-vis Cameroon on other financial sector operations that could have impacted the financial inclusion of excluded populations.

The sustainability of this particular operation can be assessed from the perspective of Cameroon's capacity to conduct an operation of the same nature in the future and on the sustainability of public debt. From these perspectives, the sustainability of the operation was unsatisfactory. In effect, the risk of over-indebtedness and non-compliance with the repayment terms within the agreed timeframe is real. Also, the process followed during the preparation of the Eurobond issue, and the partial credit guarantee operation for the currency risk hedging was not documented. The transfer of skills planned at the operation's design was therefore ineffective, despite the expertise support deployed during the preparation of the operation.

Points to consider

1. Before any commitment to hedge the exchange risk in the context of the issuance of a Eurobond or a transaction of a similar kind, ensure that the projects backing the transaction are evaluated effectively, costed realistically and that they will have a development impact. The resources generated by these projects should be able to contribute toward repaying the loan.
2. It is imperative to consult—for any operation of this nature—the regulatory and supervisory bodies of the financial sector, which have the role of adviser to the Reginal Member Countries (RMCs), conduct the exchange policy, and hold and manage the official foreign exchange reserves of the RMCs. Other stakeholders, such as the IMF or the European Union, should also be consulted.
3. Strengthen the Bank's teams' internal capacities for this type of complex and innovative financial product, so that they are even better equipped to advise RMCs by capitalizing on the experience of the operation carried out in Cameroon and the one in progress in Senegal. Subsequently, develop a manual of procedures drawn from these experiences to guide countries with weak capacity in this area to enable them to prepare and conduct this type of operation effectively and efficiently.
4. Adapt the Bank's procedures for setting up a partial credit guarantee operation to hedge the exchange risk so that the instruction time is adapted to the specific nature of this type of transaction, requiring high responsiveness.
5. Carry out better diagnostics of the financial sector before any engagement in the sector to identify opportunities with real development potential and those carrying less risk.

KENYA

Three equity investments, three lines of credits (LOCs), and one trade finance line of credit (TFLOC) were evaluated.

Project Names	Approval dates	Amounts (US$ million)	Instruments	Project status
PTA Reinsurance Company Limited (ZEP-RE)	23/02/2011	5.82	Equity	Closed
PTA Reinsurance Company Limited (ZEP-RE)	18/06/2014	2.60	Equity	Closed
East African Development Bank (EADB)	16/01/2013	15.62	Equity	On-going
East African Development Bank (EADB)	15/10/2014	26.98	LOC	On-going
Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (TDB)	07/12/2016	180	LOC	On-going
Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited	18/11/2016	36.40	LOC	On-going
Commercial Bank of Africa Limited	25/01/2017	90	TFLOC	Approved

Main Findings

The *relevance of the financing instruments was satisfactory*. The LOCs addressed the need for long-term financing and terms such as the grace period by financial institutions. The availability of the TFLOC aimed to enable some FIs to have access to a new source of financing to expand their lending activities. Moreover, the equity investments shored up the recipients' credit ratings, which enabled them to attract additional shareholders.

The *quality of the design was considered unsatisfactory*. There was a mismatch between the Bank's intended development outcomes to increase the access to finance of household enterprises in the informal sectors and MSMEs and the design of the LOCs. LOCs and TFLOCs are not the most appropriate instruments for facilitating financial access by small enterprises, women, and youth. While the TFLOC was intended mainly for SMEs, most of the beneficiaries were in fact, medium-sized companies and corporates because the definition of an SME was based on loan size, as opposed to turnover and employee numbers.

Effectiveness was satisfactory. Overall, AfDB's interventions have resulted in a greater capacity among beneficiary institutions to finance their growth. The LOC was found to be effective in beefing up lending institutions' liquidity, enabling them to diversify their sectoral focus and expand their loan portfolios. More businesses have been able to access long-term financing, enabling them to scale up their operations and create employment. There is also evidence that some of the FIs were passing on the benefits of low-interest rates and longer tenors to some of their customers. In one case, out of nine end borrowers, two were charged 7.5 and 9.0 annual percentage rates compared with the capped rate of 13 percent. Some beneficiaries experienced a bump in their credit risk rating associated with AfDB, enabling them to attract additional funding from other development finance institutions.

Efficiency was unsatisfactory. There were delays in processing the LOCs. During the initial disbursements, most financial institutions considered that it took far too long from the initial contact to the signing of loan agreements. The delays were both the result of FIs' own internal processes and compliance issues, but also the result of AfDB's overly complex approval process.

Sustainability was satisfactory. The FIs through which the instruments are channeled were financially robust, as reflected by their profitability, reputation, governance, and adherence to statutory ratios. However, they lacked the risk appetite to lend to the underserved market segments. As a result, the FIs continued to serve their traditional clients, i.e., medium-size enterprises and corporates.

AfDB's performance was satisfactory: Overall, the Bank enhanced the lending capacity of the beneficiary institutions, directly and indirectly through the provision of funds, and by inspiring confidence in other development finance institutions (DFIs) to lend to and/or partner with beneficiary institutions. However, increasing access to underserved beneficiaries would require considering lower-tier financial institutions, including microfinance banks and large deposit-taking SACCOs, as partners in serving marginalized SMEs run by women and youth.

The role of beneficiary financial institutions was satisfactory: The selected borrowing institutions were large, well-governed, and profitable corporations with considerable reach. They are serving SMEs, although with a strong focus on corporates—given the definition they use is based on loan size rather than turnover and employment numbers—and have adopted sound environmental and social standards.

Points to consider

1. Consider providing a **TA grant,** alongside the financing facilities, to build financial institutions' capacity to lend to and support priority sectors. The TA should be based on a needs assessment to identify capacity gaps in the proposed facility.
2. Enhance the capacity of AfDB's SME Program to use **specialized funds** for on-lending to specialty financial institutions, such as strong credit-only microfinance institutions and regulated co-operatives, which have experience in lending to sectors that Tier 1 commercial banks typically ignore. Also, **increase awareness and the usage of the existing Partial Credit Guarantee (PCG)** facility for financial intermediation to reach priority sectors that are typically underserved by commercial banks.
3. Develop a definition of SMEs based on a country's development profile, i.e., high-, middle- and low-income country classification that considers turnover and employee numbers.
4. Although a pipeline gives an indication of potential beneficiaries at the appraisal stage, the number of end-beneficiaries whose loans are eventually approved is significantly lower (less than 30 percent) for various

reasons. Therefore, it is better to use a **portfolio approach** during the appraisal and that FIs report actual end-beneficiaries during agreed periodic reporting. This approach provides support to priority areas such as green energy, agriculture, housing, etc.

5. Consider increasing LOC tenor to over 15 years for large infrastructure projects to: enable lending to sectors with longer maturity periods; lower the interest rate charged to FIs to enable them to offer better margins and price risks for SMEs; and increase lending in local currencies to avoid exposure to currency risk.

NAMIBIA

Two operations were evaluated: A line of credit (LOC) extended to the Development Bank of Namibia (DBN) approved in 2015 and a corporate loan extended to Trustco Finance (Trustco) approved in 2011.

Main Findings

Both operations were considered relevant as they responded to compelling needs by providing: (i) the liquidity to finance priority sectors, such as SMEs and large-scale national projects; and (ii) access to finance for youth, in particular students. The support extended to DBN and Trustco to help them on-lend to their clients at reasonable cost and make development impacts. The support aimed to allow DBN to contribute to economic growth by achieving high economic impact while maintaining sustainability. For example, DBN invested in seven SMEs out of a total of 42 projects in key economic sectors, particularly small businesses owned by women and youth. The facility to Trustco aimed to provide loans to students and to design tailor-made courses to improve specific skill sets of Namibians, instead of relying on South Africa for certain course offerings. The support also aimed at enhancing both FIs' liquidity and their ability to provide financing on appropriate and affordable terms to previously disadvantaged segments of Namibia's population, particularly women and youth, thereby contributing to the advancement of financial inclusion. Finally, the support did not cause any distortion in the market for development financing, as the terms were competitive and, therefore not significantly different from other DFIs that have thus far partnered with the two FIs.

Quality of the design. The Bank's support did not set any FSD targets, which was an obvious limitation as both operations were in the financial sector. Among other intended outcomes, it only set contributions to the private sector and the SME development. Overall, both DBN and Trustco had limited capacity to influence the realization of some of the Bank's development targets, for example, increasing the percentage employment of women and youth. It was found during the evaluation that the financing mechanism would remain appropriate and that both FIs would continue to finance end-beneficiaries post-Bank support. In terms of the strategic objectives, both of them aim to advance financial inclusion by providing financing to under-serviced communities in Namibia. Overall, it was difficult for both FIs to meet some of the targets, as some of the performance indicators in terms of the set targets could not be easily measured, especially at the end-beneficiary level.

Effectiveness. The intended outcomes captured in the respective portfolio appraisal reports included contributions toward the GDP of the benefiting sectors; employment creation; contribution to tax revenue by end-beneficiaries; increasing the number of educated Namibians; private sector and SME development; impact on productivity growth of Namibia; and increasing profits for recipients. It was found that some of the intended outcomes were not attained, as the two FIs had limited capacity to influence the realization of some of the development targets set by the Bank under the support. For DBN and Trustco, the operations increased their financial capacity. They profited from on-lending to their clients and, most importantly, were able to achieve their output targets of on-lending to a great number of clients of revolving financing. DBN financed 42 projects instead of only 20 initially planned. It achieved most of its mandated and strategic objectives, which were aligned to national development goals, policies, and initiatives. The Bank's support contributed to Namibia's economy by creating jobs and providing opportunities for continued diversification of economic activity. With the Bank's support, Trustco was able to contribute to the national priorities of providing reputable and affordable educational training under the Harambe Prosperity Plan of the Government of Namibia, and it will continue to provide such loans as its loan portfolio increased as a result of revolving the capital and interest received from the clients. However, it was only able to provide funding to 5,022 students out of an expected total of 10,500.

Efficiency. DBN felt that the Bank's process in terms of its standards and timing was satisfactory and efficient. The loan was approved for 17 years with a five-year grace period. The first disbursement occurred 15 months after approval. As of June 2018, the disbursement rate was 89 percent. By its nature and structuring, the LOC positively contributed to the performance of DBN's portfolio by increasing its margins and reducing risk. The LOC

was also cost-effective because it allowed the channeling of a large amount of funding to a single FI, which was then channeled to 42 projects. In Trustco's case, the loan application process from approval to commitment took longer, mainly due to delays in the due diligence process from Trustco's side, which means that the Bank's support was satisfactory. Although the first disbursement was in 2012, the capital was only paid in 2015, meaning that the grace period was not two years but three years. Trustco also requested a waiver again in 2017 for a further six months, while it had only repaid the capital for about two years. The extended grace period was due to delayed payments by Trustco and low monitoring by the Bank.

Sustainability. The FIs through which the two facilities were channeled were both credible, and both maintained their liquidity levels and profitability. Both FIs have long-term profitability prospects and should, therefore, be able to repay their obligations to the Bank. The ability to revolve the funding to the end-beneficiaries to give them shorter loan terms will allow both FIs to further expand their loan books and operations, as per their strategic objectives.

The results achieved by DBN and Trustco with the Bank's support were sustainable and will serve to strengthen Namibia's relationship with the Bank, maybe resulting in future support by the Bank becoming more flexible and easier to obtain in relation to the type of funding, the quantum of the funding, terms and especially collateral requirements.

The Bank's performance: Through its support, the Bank has positively enhanced the lending capacity of its FIs and contributed to the development of the private sector at large indirectly. Also, the revolving of the support allowed the operations to continue financing more projects and individuals. Direct benefits to DBN and Trustco included enhancing their lending capacity, resulting in the increased profitability of their operations.

The Bank's financial sector strategies and priorities: The Bank's country strategy paper (CSP) does not articulate the role of the financial sector in relation to FSD in Namibia, nor the role of the government in FSD, and neither do any key messages articulating the CSP include FSD in Namibia.

Points to Consider

1. Step up efforts to support FSD in Namibia to assist the government in its developmental plans, strategies, and initiatives by clearly: (i) defining the role of the financial sector in contributing to national development strategies; and (ii) articulating the initiatives that should be undertaken to drive the development and support of the financial sector.
2. Improve delivery by: (i) supporting specialized FIs, for example, by considering channeling lending through specialized financial institutions, such as DBN and other investment firms (private equity, venture capital, etc.) that have experience in lending to specific sectors that normal commercial banks and certain microfinance institutions do not serve; and (ii) setting measurable targets at the level of partner FIs, end-beneficiaries, and at the sector level to measure how specific operations contribute to broader FSD.
3. Help FIs setting up effective monitoring and evaluation to assess development results of the operations that it supports.

NIGERIA

In Nigeria, eight FSD operations were evaluated, across seven FIs, namely the Development Bank of Nigeria (DBN), Zenith Bank Plc, Access Bank Plc, Wema Bank Plc, FSDH Merchant Bank Limited, Fortis Microfinance Bank Plc and the Fund for Agricultural Finance in Nigeria (FAFIN). The deployed instruments included six LOCs, one TFLOC, and two equity funds.

Findings

The relevance of the TFLOC was satisfactory, as it enabled the FIs to provide hard currency to secure TFLOCs to import-dependent clients while complementing the Central Bank of Nigeria's (CBN) TFLOCs to export and import-led businesses. The relevance of the equity funds was satisfactory (for DBN), as it crowded in equity participation from another multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs), thus diversifying DBN's shareholding structure and reducing potential political interference. The equity funding for FAFIN complemented other DFIs' equity funding, aligned with the FGN's aim to improve earnings in agriculture and AfDB's goal of improving food security and aligned with FAFIN's focus of investing in SMEs along the agricultural value chain.

The operational design of the LOCs to Zenith, DBN, Access, and Wema was satisfactory. The development outcomes and impact were led out, although, for Access Bank, SMEs' definition was unclear, leading to corporate end-beneficiaries benefiting from the LOC. The possibility of providing the LOCs in local currencies was not explored to help the FIs on-lend to a larger number of lower-level SMEs (mitigating against the challenge of crowding out of such SMEs, as was the case with Wema Bank). The LOC's pricing structure may have caused some of the banks such as Zenith Bank to pass on costly terms to SMEs. For Fortis, AfDB received from CBN, a 'No Objection Letter' on the LOC prior to its disbursement, evidencing collaboration with a regulatory body. For the TFLOC, there was clarity in the expected outcome of a reduction in the trade finance gap and alignment with the FI's strategy to increase its trade finance portfolio. There is room for improvement in the pricing of the TFLOC. Concerning equity funding, expected development outcomes were clear (access to finance for SMEs and job creation), and activities included improving corporate governance (for DBN). The equity funding was designed to catalyze agricultural-level inclusive growth (for FAFIN), with development outcomes focused on contribution to food security. The client banks were strengthened due to the taking on board of Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) processes.

The effectiveness of the LOCs to Zenith, DBN, and Access Bank was satisfactory, that of Wema was unsatisfactory, while that of Fortis was highly unsatisfactory. A number of the FIs surpassed outcomes related to job creation and government revenue, while some ESG compliance weaknesses were recorded (for Zenith). A CBN policy on US dollar loans affected Wema's ability to lend to SMEs, leading to the LOC's ineffectiveness. Liquidity crisis and weak governance led to the revocation of Fortis' license. The TFLOC's effectiveness was satisfactory, as the FI achieved its objectives of providing letters of credit to clients at a time of their scarcity in the industry (2014-17). End-beneficiary companies expanded their businesses. For FAFIN, the equity funding's effectiveness was unsatisfactory, as some investee companies struggled in terms of their financial performance. The projected financial disbursement model was not achieved, while some ESG weaknesses were recorded. For DBN, the equity funding's effectiveness was satisfactory, as additional equity from EIB assisted DBN in maintaining good corporate governance.

The efficiency of the LOCs to Zenith, Access, and DBN was satisfactory. Good relationships exist between partner FIs and AfDB, and supervision and monitoring schedules were adhered to by AfDB, although the timelines for appraisal processes could have been shortened. The efficiency of the LOC to Wema was unsatisfactory, as valuable processing time was lost in seeking CBN's approval to on-lend in the local currency, leading to crowding out of SMEs. For Fortis, although a 'No Objection Letter' was received from CBN, additional information from financial services industry operators would have revealed growing governance weaknesses in Fortis (this reflects unsatisfactory efficiency). The efficiency of the TFLOC was satisfactory. Supervision mission schedules were adhered to, and the relationship with AfDB was good, although there is room for improvement in the appraisal processes. The efficiency of the equity fund to FAFIN and DBN was satisfactory. The relationship with AfDB was good, but there is room for improvement (for FAFIN), while appraisal process times could also be improved.

The sustainability of the LOCs to DBN, Zenith, Access and Wema was satisfactory as the FIs were positioned to continue to provide medium- and long-term credits to SMEs after these LOCs had been fully repaid. These FIs crowded in other DFIs due to the LOCs, and they also recorded impressive financial performances. The LOC to Fortis was written off, and thus, there was no sustainability of the intervention. The sustainability of the TFLOC was satisfactory. The FI was positioned to continue to provide trade-finance lines to SMEs, while it crowded in other lines from other DFIs. The sustainability of the equity funding was satisfactory. DBN is committed to continuously providing funding to PFIs. FAFIN is positioned to continue to identify agri-SMEs with investment opportunities. Clear options were defined in the exit plans.

AfDB's performance was satisfactory. AfDB deployed appropriate instruments and long-tenured funding, which crowded in other DFIs to lend to partner FIs, leading to improved FIs' capacities to lend to end-beneficiaries. It provided relevant training to the FIs to embed ESG principles that trickled down to end-beneficiaries. Areas of improvement included the adoption of a more proactive advocacy role in dealing with the financial services sector and FGN and regulatory agencies to create positive sector reforms. A review of the human resource allocation at the country office is required to ensure the adequacy of resources to deal with the large financial services sector. Potential areas of delay in approval processes could be reviewed to reduce lost opportunities to lend to end-beneficiaries, while the pricing structure should also be critically reviewed to avoid the transfer of expensive commercial terms to end-beneficiary SME companies. Also, while the roles of the partner FIs in achieving development outcomes of the interventions could be measured, these FIs may be unable to influence the end-

beneficiary SMEs to achieve outcomes, such as job creation along gender lines and tax payments. AfDB may seek to improve the measurement of these outcomes.

Points to consider

1. State the financial sector as a key strategy in CSPs, and select only realistic and achievable objectives and their related indicators.
2. Explore the adoption of a proactive portfolio approach in providing interventions to strategic areas of client institutions.
3. Provide advisory services to the FIs, especially in new and emerging sectors such as climate and green financing.
4. Explore the provision of LOCs in local currencies to not crowd out lower-level SMEs based on local regulatory policies.
5. Adopt a clear definition of SMEs in line with CBN's definition of SMEs to encourage more positive implementation outcomes.

TUNISIA

Five operations were evaluated: (i) the Apex Facility, which was a joint World Bank-AfDB LOC approved in 2011 and managed by the Central Bank of Tunisia to support SMEs through participating financial institutions; (ii) a policy-based operation (PBO) approved in 2016 focusing in the financial sector, called PAMSFI; (iii) a trade finance line of credit (TFLOC) approved in 2016 provided to the Banque de l'Habitat (BH), one of the largest state-owned banks in Tunisia; (iv) a LOC under the Africa SME Program approved in 2017, extended to Hannibal Lease (HL), a leasing company; and (v) a technical assistance (TA) grant to facilitate SME access to non-banking financing approved in 2017.

Main Findings

The relevance of the operations was satisfactory. The LOCs and TFLOC aimed to provide financing to SMEs, representing 95 percent of businesses in Tunisia—in a context of liquidity scarcity, as the country was going through a difficult political transition period. The PAMSFI operation and the grant were highly satisfactory, as they tackled some of the challenges faced at that time by the financial sector, despite the banking reforms undertaken by the Government of Tunisia. All the operations were relevant in the framework of the government's strategy to revitalize the economy through support to the MSME sector and its core priority to enable the financial sector to finance the economy.

The design of four operations out of five was assessed as satisfactory. The LOC to HL was carried out through a participatory approach and was offered with TA to strengthen its capacity. However, the tenor and the currency did not completely meet HL's needs. For the PBO preparation, AfDB led a comprehensive policy dialogue involving public authorities and financial sector stakeholders. It coordinated with international donors to learn from their experience. The grant, aimed at providing a blended approach to support SMEs access non-banking financing, was also assessed as satisfactory. The design of the Apex Facility was unsatisfactory, however. This operation missed the opportunity to provide funding to SMEs due to cumbersome eligibility requirements for participating financial institutions (PFIs), which resulted in delays and prevented the line from being used quickly, despite significant funding needs.

The effectiveness of the operations was assessed as satisfactory, except for the Apex Facility. The implementation period was extended twice; another extension has been requested, and only 70 percent of the financing has been used to date. The effectiveness of the LOC and TFLOC on the recipients was satisfactory, as both institutions could grow and attract additional international funding. The effectiveness of the PBO and the grant was also satisfactory. The PBO enabled the financial sector reform agenda to move forward despite political instability. Similarly, the grant is likely to be satisfactory. It will support public-private partnerships initiated by key stakeholders of the Tunisian financial market. As a result, the project has a strong project management capacity, which may offer it some protection against political instability. The effectiveness of the LOC to HL in serving end-beneficiaries was highly satisfactory, as small enterprises represented 87 percent of the end-beneficiaries of the first tranche. Regarding the Apex LOC and the TFLOC, this aspect was difficult to assess, as information on the end-beneficiaries was missing. The PBO could move the financial sector reform agenda forward: out of 21 actions, 15 were reached, and three were pending final authority approvals. As for the grant, this will contribute to transformative outcomes in deepening financial markets and in facilitating SME access to finance. These last two operations are also examples of effective coordination between stakeholders involved in a given ecosystem.

Government services effectively brought together various stakeholders of the financial sector and provided an enabling environment to develop access to finance and financial inclusion.

The efficiency of the operations was satisfactory, although it demonstrated contrasting results. The eligibility criteria set for financial institutions were cumbersome and added delays in disbursement for the Apex LOC. Also, the absence of regular follow-ups prevented the operation from being adjusted over time. As for the LOC to HL, the conditions precedent for signing were considered inappropriate for a financial institution supervised by the central bank and resulted in delays. These delays led to additional costs for HL, as commitment fees started to apply directly after the signing of the contract, while in the meantime, the costs of covering the exchange rate increased. The PBO's efficiency was highly satisfactory: the sector work and consultation processes were well prepared and based on lessons learned. It helped in carrying out an accurate needs assessment. The operation also demonstrated satisfactory monitoring of the development outcomes.

Overall, sustainability was satisfactory, with some discrepancies. For the Apex Facility, lack of financial information on PFIs made it difficult to evaluate this aspect. For the LOC to HL, the institution could improve its Basel II compliance and managerial capacity on Environmental and Social Management. Similarly, BH improved its managerial and financial performance. However, for the three operations above, assessing end-beneficiaries' sustainability was difficult, given the lack of financial information. Sustainability of the PBO and grant through the ownership and leadership of stakeholders involved in the project was assessed as satisfactory. The parties involved were fully committed and convinced of the benefits of the operation on access to finance and FSD. The Apex Facility was the first operation that raised awareness on environment and social impact. An Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) was put in place in Tunisia at the beginning of the operation. This required PFIs to assess the environmental and social aspects of the activities to be financed. Therefore, training was provided to them as part of the program. For BH, its policy in this regard was compliant with AfDB's procedures. For HL, this aspect needed to be formalized, which was done with AfDB's technical assistance.

The Bank's performance was satisfactory. AfDB's intervention was timely during the transition period following the 2011 Revolution. Through a mix of instruments, the Bank could exert sector-level influence, both responding to short-term financing needs and contributing to the deepening of the financial sector, by supporting financial sector reform. Apart from the Apex operation, with which the central bank was not satisfied, communication with international lenders and clients was overall considered satisfactory and showed that AfDB held open discussions. The areas of improvement highlighted during the evaluation included cumbersome processes in terms of conditions precedent to disbursement, eligibility criteria, requests for proposals, and a lack of close follow-up meetings.

Points to Consider

1. Maintain a sector-level approach aligned with both the country and FSD strategies.
2. Step up support to SMEs, define SME targets more precisely in coordination with clients, and make mandatory information collection at end-beneficiaries by financial institutions.
3. Maintain effective channels of communication with clients through coordination meetings and an electronic platform to facilitate business development.
4. Adapt financing terms to the needs and type of beneficiaries and improve the approval/ disbursement process to make efficiency gains.

AFREXIMBANK

AfDB approved two packages of operations for Afreximbank in 2014 and 2017: (i) a trade finance program (TFP-1) composed of US$150 million of trade finance lines of credit (TFLOCs), US$30 million of equity funding (EQF), and US$100 million of risk participation agreement (RPA) funding; and (ii) a trade finance program (TFP-2), including US$300 million of TFLOCs and US$150 million of RPA. The packages' main objective was to address the trade finance market gap, bolster intra-Africa trade, foster regional integration, enhance economic resilience, and support government revenue generation.

Main Findings

Relevance was highly satisfactory: TFLOCs addressed the direct trade finance needs of FIs and corporates in priority economic sectors to finance corporates and SMEs, to enhance financial and private sector development, including in low-income countries and fragile states. EQF provided much-needed capital to Afreximbank to enhance its capacity to raise funds to expand its trade finance operations, instruments and programs. RPAs aimed to raise the profile of Afreximbank to that of a confirming bank in unlocking the capital potential of Afreximbank

and FIs by guaranteeing a multiple-loan portfolio on a 50:50 basis. The support is aligned with the African Union, AfDB, and Afreximbank policies and strategies. It addressed market failures, de-risking strategies of international financial institutions (IFIs), foreign currency limitations in African markets, volatile prices of goods and commodities, and the high-risk perception relating to African trade markets.

Design quality was satisfactory: The TFPs complemented the trade finance programs availed by other multilateral development banks (MDBs) to Afreximbank and the African trade finance sector. TFLOCs are simple, flexible tools that address the trade finance needs of financial institutions and corporates. An additional two-year option was offered under TFP-2, and pricing was lower than for TFP-1. They were designed for roll-overs and were capped by ceilings. EQF is considered the most valuable signal to potential lenders and investors to raise additional operational funds for Afreximbank. Dividends distribution was tied to underlying asset performance. These were no lesser than 20 percent, with a re-investment option. RPA*s* are much-needed instruments through which Afreximbank proposes an eligible list of operations for AfDB's approval. Afreximbank conducts due diligence, supervision, monitoring, identifies non-performing loans, etc. and collects fees.

Effectiveness was satisfactory: The TFPs were effective in enhancing: (i) *access* to finance through enhanced market *breadth,* by providing several financial instruments and transactions; and (ii) *depth* as they contributed to the increase in intra-Africa trade despite a widening of Africa's trade finance gap and Africa's reduced share of global trade. TFLOCs were utilized in full in both TFPs. They added to the resilience of priority economic sectors such as: agriculture, manufacturing, mining, energy, minerals, export trading, construction, and tourism. Under both TFPs, beneficiaries included 12 financial institutions, and seven corporates spread over 14 African countries. Two transactions addressed SMEs' trade finance needs (worth 8 percent of the portfolio), and five transactions were for South-South trade. Regional trade examples included: (i) Volta River Agency in Ghana, which offered uninterrupted energy supply to Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Togo, and Benin; and (ii) Green Belt Fertilizers Ltd. in Zambia led to improved cropping in Malawi and Mozambique. At the Afreximbank level, TFLOC-1 created 57 permanent jobs between 2015 and 2018. At the financial-institution level, it created 700 direct jobs and over 2,250 indirect jobs. TFLOC-2 was offered to 12 financial institutions in seven countries and two SMEs (until 30 June 2019). EQF effectively enhanced Afreximbank capacity to raise funds and engage the private sector in its capital (Class D shareholders), thus contributing to private and financial sector development. RPAs were effective in offering 145 transactions in TFP-1; eight in TFP-2; three financial institutions; and 80 percent of transactions to SMEs (based on US$1 million definition, unlike the adopted US$500,000). Transactions were based on the personal efforts of two Afreximbank staffers. In RPA-1, seven transactions benefited two fragile states, namely Rwanda and Zimbabwe, and 95.5 percent (138 transactions) went to low-income countries. RPA-2 was effective in offering three Issuing Banks 40 percent geared to SMEs, and a US$544 million contribution to global trade. *Government revenues* generated through tax revenues are estimated at US$100 million for TFP-1 and US$420 million for TFP-2. As far as *gender equity* is concerned at the Afreximbank level, 40 percent of staff in 2018/19 were women, and women held 17 percent of senior management positions (4/23). No evidence was available on the effectiveness of operations on youth, rural vs. urban transactions, or at the level of financial institutions.

Efficiency was satisfactory: The TFPs were profitable for both AfDB and Afreximbank. AfDB generated around US$15 million in TFLOCs, US$1.5 million in RPAs, and an average of 23% per year in dividends per share in return for EQF. It was estimated that the facilities could generate revenue equal to at least two times its operating costs, rendering profits to AfDB. Profits generated by Afreximbank from the operations and their roll-over were not made available. The efficiency of Afreximbank was enhanced with higher profitability, growing total assets, low NPLs, and zero defaults. AfDB is driven by development goals over financial rewards, while the contrary is true for Afreximbank. Driven by pecuniary gain, Afreximbank adopted a wholesale approach for big-ticket transactions. This resulted in sectorial mis-targeting, a lower number of transactions, financial institutions, corporates, SMEs, and countries' beneficiaries. Data and reporting issues accompanied this. First-comers who accessed finance through the operations were not accounted for. TFLOC efficiency was undermined by a number of shortcomings such as fund-pooling leading to tenor infringements and a lack of attribution measurement and field reporting on development outcomes. For EQF, no significant efficiency issues were observed. EQF funding transfer was timely through a signed equity participation agreement. Timely dividend payments were the norm at Afreximbank, with an option for re-investment. Afreximbank periodical expansion of the shareholder base led to an erosion of AfDB's relative share in Afreximbank, thereby backing Afreximbank's retention of investment grade. Afreximbank's efficiency is tied to AfDB's periodic EQF funding investments. Regarding RPAs, the efficiency was satisfactory for the RPA of TFP-1 but unsatisfactory for the RPA-2. An AfDB supervision mission in May 2019

observed that the RPA of the second package was underutilized and suggested increasing the threshold of eligible transactions better to align the conditions with Afreximbank's typical transaction volumes. The two RPAs had the same conditions applied to them. However, for the second RPA, Afreximbank changed its approach, preferring to focus on larger deals, whereas AfDB had requested SMEs' financing. Hence, 40 percent of the second-package RPA was not utilized.

The sustainability rating was satisfactory: Environment and Social Sustainability and Exclusion Lists are taken as proxies for sustainability at the beneficiary level. Afreximbank has adopted them on trade finance applicants since 2009. Evidence shows compliance through desk-based checklists at Afreximbank. Cases from the field reported by AfDB are the Volta River Agency in Ghana and Diamond Bank in Nigeria, which show compliance with state environmental conservation regulations, etc. At the Afrexinbank level, four higher positions were assigned to women. No direct attribution to women's empowerment and results sustainability were evidenced, and jobs created (directly or indirectly) were estimated without evidence of sustained effects. TFLOCs enhanced the capacity and credentials of Afreximbank, financial institutions, and corporates. Financial support to financial institutions enhanced financial stability and governance, and access to finance to corporates fostered corporate sustainability. The same holds for Afreximbank. EQFs are long-term investments that add/contribute toward the sustainability of Afreximbank, as a sign of support to other potential lenders and investors by an AAA-rated MDB. RPA guarantees affirm the viability of the underlying assets and project guarantees, therefore enhancing the sustainability of the beneficiaries, financial institutions, and Afreximbank.

Suggestions

1. Increase financial and human resources to realize the tangible impact in collaboration with other MDBs, both for lending and non-lending operations for capacity-building programs for financial institutions, corporates, and SMEs.
2. Revamp the theory of change and the operations' logical results framework to ensure integrated links between new financial sector strategy objectives, pillars, and trade finance operations.
3. Improve trade finance monitoring, supervision and advisory functions.
4. Partner with Afreximbank in programming regional policy dialogue and partnerships on non-trade barriers, trade finance, digitization, networking, knowledge products, etc. to bolster (intra- and inter-) African trade, and sustainable and equitable growth.

Annex 5. Financial sector operations per country during 2011-2018

	Countries	2011-2014 (UA million)	Development level	Countries	2015-2018 (UA million)	Development level	Countries	211-2018 (UA million)	Development level
Nr	**Multinational**	**1466.99**	**NA**	**Multinational**	**2642.0**	**NA**	**Multinational**	**4107.99**	**NA**
1	Nigeria	**1025.1**	Lower Middle Income	Nigeria	**503.7**	Lower Middle Income	Nigeria	**1528.8**	Lower Middle Income
2	Morocco	**345.9**	Low Income	Cameroon	**399.0**	Low Income	Morocco	**551.8**	Low Income
3	South Africa	**273.07**	Low Income	Senegal	**390.8**	Lower Middle Income	Cameroon	**399.87**	Low Income
4	Kenya	**100.1**	Lower Middle Income	Angola	**300.2**	Low Income	Senegal	**390.8**	Lower Middle Income
5	Mauritius	**79.79**	Upper Middle Income	Tunisia	**287.5**	Low Income	South Africa	**321.57**	Low Income
6	Tunisia	**31.24**	Low Income	Namibia	**262.3**	Upper middle income	Tunisia	**318.74**	Low Income
7	Ghana	**13.25**	Low Income	Kenya	**213.3**	Lower Middle Income	Kenya	**313.4**	Lower Middle Income
8	Uganda	**12.61**	Lower Middle Income	Morocco	**205.9**	Low Income	Angola	**300.2**	Low Income
9	Niger	**11.15**	Low Income	Cote d'Ivoire	**96.5**	Upper Middle Income	Namibia	**267.33**	Upper middle income
10	Mozambique	**5.82**	Lower Middle Income	Tanzania	**87.5**	Low Income	Mauritius	**150.19**	Upper Middle Income
11	Namibia	**5.03**	Upper middle income	Ghana	**85.8**	Low Income	Ghana	**99.05**	Low Income
12	Mali	**4.97**	Lower Middle Income	Mauritius	**71.0**	Upper Middle Income	Cote d'Ivoire	**96.5**	Upper Middle Income
13	Tanzania	**3.69**	Low Income	Botswana	**55.6**	Low Income	Tanzania	**91.19**	Low Income
14	Burkina Faso	**2.21**	Low income	Burkina Faso	**54.6**	Low income	Burkina Faso	**56.81**	Low income
15	Zambia	**0.98**	Lower middle income	South Africa	**48.5**	Low Income	Botswana	**55.6**	Low Income
16	Cameroon	**0.87**	Low Income	Mali	**45.2**	Lower Middle Income	Mali	**50.17**	Lower Middle Income
17	Benin	**0.85**	Upper Middle Income	Zambia	**41.0**	Lower middle income	Zambia	**41.98**	Lower middle income
18	DR Congo	**0.17**	Low Income	Swaziland	**19.6**	Upper Middle Income	Uganda	**26.81**	Lower Middle Income

19	Liberia	**0.14**	Low Income	Rwanda	**18.9**	Low Income	Swaziland	**19.6**	Upper Middle Income
20	Algeria	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Liberia	**18.7**	Low Income	Rwanda	**18.9**	Low Income
21	Burundi	**0.0**	Low Income	Zimbabwe	**17.7**	Lower Middle Income	Liberia	**18.84**	Low Income
22	Cabo verde	**0.0**	Low Income	Mauritania	**15.7**	Upper Middle Income	Niger	**17.75**	Low Income
23	Central African Rep,	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Uganda	**14.2**	Lower Middle Income	Zimbabwe	**17.7**	Lower Middle Income
24	Chad	**0.0**	Low Income	South Sudan	**13.4**	Low Income	Mauritania	**15.7**	Upper Middle Income
25	Comores	**0.0**	Low Income	DR Congo	**10.4**	Low Income	South Sudan	**13.4**	Low Income
26	Congo	**0.0**	Lower middle income	Niger	**6.6**	Low Income	DR Congo	**10.57**	Low Income
27	Djibouti	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Benin	**5.0**	Upper Middle Income	Benin	**5.85**	Upper Middle Income
28	Equatorial Guinea	**0.0**	Low Income	Ethiopia	**5.0**	Low Income	Mozambique	**5.82**	Lower Middle Income
29	Eritrea	**0.0**	Low Income	Sierra Leonne	**3.5**	Lower Middle Income	Ethiopia	**5.0**	Low Income
30	Gabon	**0.0**	Low Income	Guinea	**2.4**	Lower Middle Income	Sierra Leonne	**3.5**	Lower Middle Income
31	Gambia	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Sao Tome & Principe	**1.5**	Low income	Guinea	**2.4**	Lower Middle Income
32	Guinea-Bissau	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Egypt	**0.9**	Low Income	Sao Tome & Principe	**1.5**	Low income
33	Lesotho	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Mozambique	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Egypt	**0.9**	Low Income
34	Libya	**0.0**	Low Income	Algeria	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Algeria	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income
35	Madagascar	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Burundi	**0.0**	Low Income	Burundi	**0.0**	Low Income
36	Malawi	**0.0**	Low income	Cabo verde	**0.0**	Low Income	Cabo verde	**0.0**	Low Income
37	Seychelles	**0.0**	High Income	Central African Rep,	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Central African Rep,	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income
38	Somalia	**0.0**	Low Income	Chad	**0.0**	Low Income	Chad	**0.0**	Low Income
39	Sudan	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Comores	**0.0**	Low Income	Comores	**0.0**	Low Income
40	Togo	**0.0**	Low income	Congo	**0.0**	Lower middle income	Congo	**0.0**	Lower middle income

41	Egypt	**0.0**	Low Income	Djibouti	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Djibouti	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income
42	Sao Tome & Principe	**0.0**	Low income	Equatorial Guinea	**0.0**	Low Income	Equatorial Guinea	**0.0**	Low Income
43	Guinea	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Eritrea	**0.0**	Low Income	Eritrea	**0.0**	Low Income
44	Sierra Leonne	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Gabon	**0.0**	Low Income	Gabon	**0.0**	Low Income
45	Ethiopia	**0.0**	Low Income	Gambia	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Gambia	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income
46	South Sudan	**0.0**	Low Income	Guinea-Bissau	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Guinea-Bissau	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income
47	Mauritania	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Lesotho	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Lesotho	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income
48	Zimbabwe	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Libya	**0.0**	Low Income	Libya	**0.0**	Low Income
49	Rwanda	**0.0**	Low Income	Madagascar	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Madagascar	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income
50	Swaziland	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Malawi	**0.0**	Low income	Malawi	**0.0**	Low income
51	Botswana	**0.0**	Low Income	Seychelles	**0.0**	High Income	Seychelles	**0.0**	High Income
52	Cote d'Ivoire	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Somalia	**0.0**	Low Income	Somalia	**0.0**	Low Income
53	Angola	**0.0**	Low Income	Sudan	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income	Sudan	**0.0**	Upper Middle Income
54	Senegal	**0.0**	Lower Middle Income	Togo	**0.0**	Low income	Togo	**0.0**	Low income
	Total	**3382.3**			**5943.9**			**9326.2**	